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SÍNTESE – A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE)
sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a 
imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual,
ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no 
centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indiví-
duos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais
bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se
não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tives-
sem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o 
dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. 
Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um
grave defeito, porque fracassa ao se ajustar à
natureza social dos questionamentos (epistêmi-
cos) típicos. Esse e outros defeitos relacionados a
esse infectam o paralelo que os teóricos VE 
traçam entre virtudes epistêmicas e morais. Ao
prometer o incremento na proporção de crenças
verdadeiras sobre crenças falsas, ou ignorância,
as virtudes epistêmicas não podem desempenhar
um papel paralelo àquele que Aristóteles reserva 
às virtudes morais ao prometer o incremento em
nossa felicidade e no bem-estar da comunidade. 
A minha rota para essas críticas é feita das
razões sobre por que os agentes (sociais) devem
buscar a obtenção de seus objetivos morais e
epistêmicos diferentemente nos papéis que
atribuem às virtudes. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVES – Virtude epistêmica.
Divisão de trabalho epistêmico. Diversidade.
Conhecimento. Falibilidade. Virtude moral. 
ABSTRACT – Epistemic Virtue (EV) theory holds 
that virtues of agents, like impartiality or open-
mindedness, rather than specific beliefs, should be 
at the center of epistemological evaluation, and 
that individuals with those virtues are better 
positioned epistemically than if they lacked them 
or, worse, if they instead had the corresponding 
vices: prejudice, dogmatism, or close-mindedness.
I argue that EV theory suffers from a serious flaw 
because it fails to accommodate to the social 
nature of typical (epistemic) inquiries. This and 
related flaws infect the parallel that EV theorists 
allege between epistemic and moral virtues. In 
promising to improve our ratio of true beliefs to 
either false beliefs or ignorance, the epistemic 
virtues cannot play a roll parallel to that which 
Aristotle claims for the moral virtues in promising 
to increase our happiness and the well-being of 
the community. The path to these criticisms I 
introduce by offering reasons for why (social) 
agents should seek to realize their epistemic and 
moral goals very differently in the respective roles 
they accord to the virtues. 
KEY WORDS – Epistemic virtue. Division of 
epistemic labor. Diversity. Knowledge. Fallibility.
Moral virtue. 
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1. The underlying theme of this paper is that the usual ideals for character 
traits and methodological guides to further truth acquisition (and falsity reduction) 
must be modified within social, as contrasted to individual, inquiries. My explicit 
theme is an application of this underlying one to Epistemic Virtue (EV) Theory. EV 
theory holds that the development in an individual of virtues like impartiality or 
open-mindedness, as contrasted to bias, dogmatism, or close-mindedness, will 
render that individual in a better epistemic position than if he lacked them. 
The critical implication of the explicit theme is that EV theory suffers from a 
serious flaw because it fails to accommodate to the social nature of many (epis-
temic) inquiries. The flaw infects the parallel that EV theorists draw between epis-
temic and moral virtues. I deny that the epistemic virtues benefit us to realizing a 
better ratio of true over false beliefs (or ignorance) in parallel to how the Aristote-
lian moral virtues are expected to increase one’s happiness (and that of the com-
munity). Specifically, I deny the implication that the more virtue, all other things 
equal (e.g. tragedies aside), is the better. 
2. Epistemic virtue theorists aim to reorient epistemology as moral virtue 
theorists aim to reorient moral philosophy. The project, according to one state-
ment, is the 
epistemological analogue of the claim made by recent ethicists that the moral virtues 
should be the focus of ethics [...] 
Epistemology is to be reoriented so that 
the intellectual virtues being the, or a primary, focus of epistemological inquiry (Kvan-
vig, 1992: p. vii). 
The epistemic virtues aim at truth or knowledge and they are designed, or to be 
inculcated, so as to realize these aims. The locus of epistemic evaluation is to be 
shifted from a belief to the believer, as moral virtue theory seeks to shift the locus 
of evaluation from acts to agents. Most EV theorists, though not all, are ambitious 
in taking the epistemic virtues, properly understood, to explicate core epistemic 
notions – justification, warrant, and knowledge, even if these notions are reinter-
preted in their accounts.
2 
However, beyond these claims, there is a divide among EV theorists.
3 One 
approach, which is closest to reliabilism, takes the locus of evaluation to be cogni-
tive faculties, including largely automatic ones, like memory or perception. The 
other approach, which aligns itself with moral virtue theory, takes the locus of 
evaluation to be intellectual virtues as character traits. (Still, even this dividing line 
is murky – most of those who take the latter approach adopt reliability con-
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straints.) Thus, Zagzebski argues at length for a close modeling of the intellectual 
(epistemic) virtues on Aristotle’s account of the moral virtues, including that to act 
virtuously is to act for the sake of that virtue – to be virtuously motivated. In the 
Introduction to her book she writes: 
[...] I will argue that the relationship between the evaluation of cognitive activity and 
the evaluation of acts in the overt sense usually reserved to ethics is more than an 
analogous one. I will argue that the intellectual virtues are so similar to the moral vir-
tues in Aristotle’s sense of the latter that they ought not to be treated as two different 
kinds of virtue. Intellectual virtues are, in fact, forms of moral virtue [...] 
Finally, I will argue that intellectual virtue is the primary normative component of both 
justified belief and knowledge. The justifiedness of beliefs is related to intellectual vir-
tue as the rightness of acts is related to moral virtue in a pure virtue ethics (1996,  
xiv-xv). 
3. My main criticisms are directed to this second approach, so that when I 
speak of “EV theory” that is the view to which I will be referring. I use “inquiry” in 
a very broad and loose way to refer to any fairly systematic method to obtain, 
modify, and improve beliefs toward realizing their aim of truth or knowledge by 
way of investigating specific claims or hypotheses through empirical or critical 
methods. I focus on social inquiries in settings other than institutional ones, like 
science. I am particularly concerned to challenge EV theories in application to the 
broadest domain of non-institutional inquiries, as with a town committee set up to 
determine the feasibility of expanding an existing school to handle growth in the 
student population. Nevertheless, a number of examples are from institutional 
inquiries both for their familiarity and because if the problems for EV theories arise 
in those settings, they will clearly be more formidable in non-institutional ones. 
As a way to address epistemological issues, the alleged parallel between the 
moral and epistemic virtues seems extremely implausible on its face. I’ll set out 
four differences that show a wide gulf between the tasks and the domains of the 
moral and epistemic virtues, which the criticisms below of EV theory draw upon. 
The differences are: first, differences in the activities or domains to which the 
virtues are to serve as guides; second, differences in the import of their respective 
first-person points of view; third, differences in the relation of these respective 
virtues to self-interest; and fourth, differences in the roles of these respective vir-
tues in realizing their ultimate end or objective. 
First, the epistemic virtues are primarily directed to guiding one’s intellectual 
activities (reasonings, thoughts, inferences, or beliefs), while the moral virtues are 
largely directed to how we treat others. The moral virtues characteristically oper-
ate as restraints on actions to regulate and harmonize our (social) behavior toward 
others. We act honestly; we examine our position with intellectual honesty. 
There is then much more latitude for deviation from norms in the epistemic 
than in the moral realm. The costs of error or the value of being correct are far 
greater in the moral than in the epistemic realm. When we act immorally we typi-
cally hurt others. But in the epistemic realm the harm (to others) is usually weak   40
and indirect. Consequently, even under the restrictions noted above, we can – and 
we should be and we are – more carefree (“Popperian”) in the range of our epis-
temic acts than in our ethical acts, and that is essential to advancing inquiry. (I do 
not deny that epistemic judgments – or, theoretical reasoning as issuing in belief – 
can be enormously consequential. But the influences of our epistemic judgment on 
how we act is a further step from that judgment, a species of practical reasoning.  
I also do not want to quibble with anyone who maintains that epistemic judg-
ments, such as what lines of inquiry to pursue, count as action. The wide differ-
ence in risks, dangers, or costs between the domains remain. If I ignore certain 
evidence that I should obtain, I am epistemically negligent or irresponsible. But 
the evidence itself couldn’t care less. If I ignore you at a dinner party, I am rude 
and I offend, and so harm, you.) 
Second, the first-person perspective of an inquirer acting contrary to an 
epistemic virtue is, as noted earlier, to deny that he holds it dogmatically or in 
violation of some epistemic virtue (e.g, to believe hastily). But for unethical acts, 
the parallel fails – there is no conceptual compulsion to judge one’s immoral act 
moral. I can believe that I acted rudely and that it is wrong, whereas I cannot 
continue to believe that p, and to believe that I believe it dogmatically. 
Third, the ethical virtues serve to curb or thwart self-interest, while the 
epistemic virtues serve mainly to guide it. To act justly and honestly, when 
these virtues are called upon (e.g. the cashier returns too much change to you 
and you think that no one else notices it) is to forgo clear benefits or rewards for 
oneself.
4 I do not doubt that ultimately, in the long run, and from a broader per-
spective (of garnering the cooperation of others), the moral virtues do further 
self-interest in the community, whose betterment filters through to individual 
members. But the benefits are neither direct nor assured, and they call for regu-
lar sacrifice of immediate self-interest. 
However, in areas of interest, our self-interest lies in correct beliefs, rather 
than incorrect ones or ignorance, since these provide the best assurance that 
our actions succeed. The epistemic virtues are good guides to acquiring true 
beliefs, as by keeping oneself responsive to the evidence. So we generally have 
a built-in, clear motive toward acting in accord with the epistemic virtues that 
we do not have for the moral virtues. 
Fourth, realizing the truth-aim of the epistemic virtues is filled with surprise. 
The surprise holds even for ordinary inquiries, since at its minimal it simply 
amounts to our ignorance, in advance, of their outcomes. But the community 
composed of the morally virtuous is thereby constituted by happiness-features 
under normal functioning. Kindness or honesty are traits in others that we nor-
mally admire. We know that they add to our security, pleasure, and well-being. No  
combination of epistemic virtues constitutes discerning a (new) truth. The search 
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for truth is a mystery. We do not grasp in advance the truth as a way to shape 
how we should act epistemically virtuously. However, it is evident to us how our 
happiness is furthered by the moral virtues and that is why we seek to instill them 
widely. 
The shortest path to the criticisms of EV theory below opens with this last 
difference: The epistemic virtues and vices can serve a strategic purpose that is 
unnecessary for the moral virtues. Directed as epistemic virtues are mainly to 
intellectual matters (the first difference above), there is little potential harm done 
in deviance. We need to think strategically because the goal of the epistemic vir-
tues and inquiry is to discern new truths and to expose false beliefs, which are, 
from our point of view as inquirers, a mystery. So we want to guard against elimi-
nating viable contenders, which involves guarding against our own potential mis-
judgments. We also want to reduce our burden by exploiting the potential contri-
bution of others in shared inquiries, even when ideological foes. 
But in the case of happiness there is little mystery. The difficulty is rather to 
curb individual self-interest that is the barrier to cooperation from which we all 
benefit. However, there is only a need to guide, not to restrain, self-interest in the 
epistemic domain, since self-interest seeks satisfaction in knowing more about 
what matters to one. 
This last disparity hints that the criticisms of EV theory below have an ‘invisi-
ble hand’ form. The discovery of new truths best emerges from granting a free 
hand to self-interest, given a pluralist community with a high degree of involve-
ment in inquiry. Although this is only a facet of the criticism, it still might be 
thought to seriously backfire. Could not an argument, akin to our central one, be 
mounted to the conclusion that the flourishing of a community, particularly its 
economic advancement, under conditions of modest need and scarcity, requires 
various moral vices like greed, along lines of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’? Per-
haps, for example, the virtue of beneficence allows, or even requires, that the 
virtuous agent here and there performs acts of greed or flattery, and, in part, be-
cause these are also aspects of our nature as social beings. 
However forceful this suggestion is for bringing the moral and epistemic vir-
tues closer, it does not upset my criticisms. For the model of the moral virtues that 
EV theorists draw their parallel to is Aristotle’s, and he could not hold such a 
mixed – invisible hand – view of the ways that the virtues benefit. 
We proceed to develop into specific criticisms of EV theory the wide gulf just 
enumerated between the moral and the epistemic virtues. 
4. The primary criticism of EV theories will be that both directly and indi-
rectly, by way of their parallel with the moral virtues, they are committed to a 
uniformity of epistemic virtues across an inquiry as best, while our argument con-
cludes that non-uniformity, above a high threshold of epistemic virtues, is best. In 
brief, it is epistemically better in an inquiry for most to be epistemically virtuous 
rather than all. That criticism divides into three.   42
The first is that the great value to inquiry of dissent is better realized if the 
epistemic virtues are not held uniformly across the community, as EV theories 
recommend. Inquiries function well only if there is lively diversity of ideas or opin-
ions on the major issues, which follows from Mill’s (1978) defense of free speech 
and the dangers of a lack of dissent to deliberative decision making. 
The second, which is engaged with the first, is about the individual inquirer. 
It claims that a freer reign for non-virtuous motives than a demand for purity is 
also expected to be comparatively better. Consequently, I can agree with a lot of 
what epistemic virtue theorists want to say in praise of specific epistemic virtues 
and with much of what they say about the advantages of these virtues for the 
inquiring community. Nevertheless, these two criticisms, which lend detail to the 
abstract presentation of the four differences set out above, sever the alleged paral-
lel between the epistemic and moral virtues. Specifically, I deny that those who 
proceed well epistemically require epistemically virtuous motives. To the contrary, 
the demand for such purity of motives will retard inquiry. 
Third, much of the obvious losses or dangers of deviation from the epistemic 
virtues and of their impurification are promised to be effortlessly compensated for 
through the on-going operation of the division of epistemic labor. The division enor-
mously lightens the informational burdens of inquiry, which is essential, given our 
limited time and resources (Kitcher 1993, Chapter 8). Those who are better posi-
tioned to gather relevant data or to perform tests or to critically examine certain 
claims should do so, and share their findings with other members. In deciding what 
informational sources to attend to for increasing your understanding on virtually any 
topic, you rely on the direct recommendations of others or through the citations 
found in various respected writings. However fallible and subject to fads is this un-
avoidable short-cut, you would either be overwhelmed to try to determine what is 
worthwhile on your own or else you would be arbitrary, picking virtually haphaz-
ardly from among the vast amount published or reported. The division of epistemic 
labor will help to protect dissent and to promote inquiry, while avoiding the heavy 
demands of purity on inquirers to which EV theory is committed. 
If a community is made up of the epistemically virtuous, they will each be 
open-minded and highly responsive to the weight of evidence and argument. 
However diverse the set of ideas (hypotheses, etc.) in play initially, there will be 
times when one idea seems to be better to a plurality of members of the commu-
nity than others, even if only marginally. The threat to diversity arises because this 
marginal preference and slight advantage will amplify for social and personal rea-
sons, such as the greater enjoyment of harmony, and for epistemic reasons, espe-
cially of reasons to defer to the community’s judgment. Inquirers give some posi-
tive weight to the consensus or dominant view of others, greater weight with 
greater consensus, assuming a virtuous respect for the community’s workings. 
Even those starting off with contrary ideas will be moved by the (apparent) weight 
of evidence and argument, as well as their virtuous intellectual respect for one 
another and the community, toward favoring the leading ideas and disfavoring the 
competing ones. Under realistic conditions, the slight advantage will often grow to   43
a commanding dominance, depleting diversity in the forums of public discussion, 
rendering it very difficult to give a hearing to ideas that conflict with the dominant 
view and criticisms of it. 
By contrast, a community where a substantial, but still very few, members are 
dogmatically  committed to their disfavored positions will, under similar circum-
stances, not be moved to fall in line with the dominant view. If they can remain 
actively involved in the discourse, rather than dismissed as cranks or contrarians, 
they will help keep their deviant ideas in play. One of these may come to be seen as 
better than the fairly dominant one and, in any case, as Mill stressed, the contro-
versy will disallow dominant ideas from merely being taken for granted. It will have 
to keep up the intellectual fight. I assume that this community is epistemically in 
better shape than the previous one. 
Why dogmatic, rather than just reasonable dissenters? The question miscon-
strues the argument: Even if the dissent is dogmatic, it is advantageous. 
The stipulation is realistic, since the dissenters deny the force of argument or 
evidence which all take to favor the dominant view. To this extent, the dogmatists 
have epistemically virtuous grounds to view themselves as dogmatic, which is in 
conflict with their first-person view of themselves. To be realistic, my stipulation 
assumes only first, that the intellectual community is basically well functioning; 
second, that a person’s belief as dogmatically held is susceptible to objective deter-
mination, dependent primarily on the level of available evidence; third, that dogma-
tism comes in degrees, and that the dissenters we are imagining are not at the ex-
treme (pig-headed). I do not however assume that dogmatism is a consistent trait of 
character, rather than restricted to certain inquiries. (See further note 7.) 
The key observation is that the increasing consensus of the community on an 
idea is a strong reason for each to endorse it. Those who have the intellectual vir-
tues of modesty and honesty are more likely than those lacking these virtues to 
allow their contrary judgments to be overruled by the community consensus. The 
issue at hand is not one where a dissenter can readily explain away the group con-
sensus on the basis of illicit grounds such as forceful, perceived self-interest, as with 
refusals of a town to allow for low-income housing based predominantly on an ex-
pected drop in their property values. 
An everyday example that brings out both the value and the difficulty of dissent 
is of a local parent-school organization, where the parents are setting up a fur fash-
ion show to raise funds for various worthy school projects. You are opposed to the 
wearing of fur. I think it is easy to imagine that your grounds are not decisive and 
yet the consensus of your neighbors, whom you cannot dismiss as narrow-minded 
or elitist is overwhelming. If you dig in your heels, arguing strongly against the pro-
posal, it is easy to envisage that you appear to them as extremist and dogmatic, and 
for good reasons. In order to enter your dissent, you will have to overcome your own 
(virtuous) pulls toward accepting the dominant view. You will likely frustrate your 
personal virtues of good spirit and interest in being well liked and enjoying group 
solidarity. To sustain your position personally, you will find it difficult not to become 
defensively dismissive and intolerant of their view, a further move away from virtue 
and purity.   44
Nevertheless, as with the ‘emperor’s new clothes’, your willingness to speak 
out, despite the prospect of ostracism, may be the only way to keep valuable criti-
cal opposition in play. The very act of dissent stands a good chance of encourag-
ing others to speak out as well, though they are so far silent, although actually 
unenthused too about the dominant view. The main point, in short, is that your 
dogmatic dissent may advance the epistemic interests of the community com-
pared to one of consensus which, I claim, will partly be due to a uniformity of 
epistemic virtues like open-mindedness, and intellectual honesty and modesty. 
5. Psychologists and social scientists teach us of the danger of ‘groupthink’ 
(Janis 1972) that is one source for my concerns about promoting an ideal of a uni-
formity in open-mindedness, which I treat (for brevity) as including to follow whe-
re the evidence or argument leads and to defer – give weight – to dominant opin-
ions in one’s intellectual community. Groupthink is the tendency of groups to 
come to a shared decision not because it is best or optimal, but because the group 
dynamics favors agreement and strongly disfavors dissent. If there is a dominant 
view in the group and an absence of dissent, empirical studies show that the 
outcome of exchanges within the group will be to polarize positions further than 
how they were originally held by individual members – a crucial step toward ex-
tremism.
5 
Those who have studied the dangers of groupthink have also told us how re-
markably little it takes to break its grip: It turns out that in many groupthink set-
tings, if only one respected individual – lacking, for example, a reputation as a 
contrarian – does voice dissent, that is usually sufficient to break the groupthink 
grip. This vulnerability is a presupposition of my previous and next example, and 
it supports my claim that the alternative to EV theory that I defend requires no 
more than a small minority to lack the epistemic virtues. 
As I return to below, think of how worthwhile it is for livening up a discussion 
and for breaking a smug solidarity for one to play ‘devil’s advocate.’ Think also, 
however, of the personal and social strains against so doing in ordinary circum-
stances, where that role is not overtly assigned. If you are genuinely playing, so 
that you do not hold the belief that you defend to the group, the pretense is diffi-
cult to sustain. Worse, if the role-playing continues for an extended period, others 
in the group are unlikely to think that you are merely playing. 
For an example, imagine an extremist, say a Strom Thurmond-type, in the 
U.S. Senate. I will use the name ‘Strom Thurmond’ to suggest the character I 
mean to represent, though the illustration is fanciful. Assume that a Democratic 
and Republican committee of the Senate formulates a bill on defense appropria-
tions that achieves unanimous support. So it’s likely to receive quick passage. 
However, the bill is complex. Because of the usual time constraints, pressures, 
and political interests, little attention would be paid to many of its details. But the 
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members know that one of Thurmond’s favorite tactics for destroying a bill is to 
expose and exaggerate minor weaknesses or errors, in order to smear the whole 
document. In this situation, Thurmond’s extremism will probably serve the inter-
est of truth (in this case, an optimal or excellent defense appropriations bill). It will 
compel those who write and check the document to closely scrutinize the details. 
The description of Thurmond’s actions is meant to satisfy some epistemic 
vices (e.g. prejudiced, dogmatic), however these are properly characterized. I am 
not staking my own position that his maneuver is a smear tactic because, e.g., it 
focuses on minor failings. Similarly, the unreasonableness of Thurmond’s extrem-
ism is not an inference from locating his position at the end-point of a range of 
views on an issue. 
If Thurmond’s viceful actions and tactics play a vital positive role in the in-
quiry on the Senate bill and if in many, typical inquiries there is no regularly avail-
able and feasible substitute for this role, the lesson is that a non-uniform distribu-
tion of the epistemic virtues, and even the exhibiting of vice-like behavior (e.g. 
dogmatism), is necessary to advance epistemic inquiries against the regular threat 
of homogenity of ideas. 
The lesson holds though only if the Thurmond-case is not a rarified construc-
tion. The example needs to display epistemic difficulties that inquiries are ex-
pected to confront commonly. The realistic nature of the illustration, however, 
depends upon three restrictions, already suggested: First, Thurmond, though a 
detested voice, still must be heard respectfully (by other Senators and the public). 
Second, Thurmond works his (usefully) devious ways through admissible activi-
ties--public argument and standard political arm-twisting, not through illicit or 
illegal surreptitious means e.g., extortion. He grates on the system without seri-
ously marring its functioning. Third, Thurmond remains in a small minority. Oth-
erwise, were his extremism to spread, it would infect and sully the Senate’s delib-
erative and decision-making processes. 
6. The Thurmond example, like others below, is within an institutional set-
ting, for reasons already noted. Aside from the codified (and enforced) nature of 
the rules of behavior and of individual advance in institutions, science, as the 
paradigm, they are equipped with powerful resources to sustain diversity and to 
motivate participation in inquiry: first, and crucially, there is strong incentive for 
originality, and so for divergence from standard positions and criticism of domi-
nant views; second, the institution can impose a system or structure to generate 
diversity such as appointing – preferably, anonymously – a devil’s advocate or 
those of unrepresentative background or ideology; third, there is rigorous checking 
(verification) of claims as a matter of course; fourth, one’s professional and institu-
tional life is different from one’s social and personal life, though, by happenstance 
they frequently overlap. Thurmond’s constituency is pleased by his grating on the 
workings of the Senate, and they reward him, through re-election, as well as adu-
lation.   46
As a consequence of this last disparity, the desire to be well liked and to be 
sociable, as a result of how one pursues (social-epistemic) inquiries, is much more 
of a problem in non-institutional settings. Socrates is famously disliked for his 
interrogation of citizens about matters of fundamental values. When groupthink 
takes place it is not so recognized – the agreement is taken as a convergence, not 
a reflection of the desire for group harmony. Even when some suspect otherwise, 
it is part of the groupthink not to acknowledge it. So dissenters are perceived as 
just not seeing the truth, and they stand a good chance of social alienation and 
ostracism. 
7. Common sense reflection on time and motivation show that non-
compliance with ideals like open-mindedness could be requisite for motivation to 
pursue inquiry and to success in it.
6 Those with important or bold visions and 
theses could not pursue them, or not with intense single-mindedness, without 
wearing blinders to many objections that are taken seriously by others. As an 
obvious example, consider B.F. Skinner and others with grand projects, who are 
single-minded in their intellectual pursuit and correlatively have little time or pa-
tience to address the numerous criticisms of their positions. To address these 
objections, even if they could answer them, would distract them. As a result, their 
pursuit would be badly hampered, intellectual life the poorer. 
Given the division of epistemic labor and the incentives of the academic 
world, however, there is little danger that their disinterest in the criticisms of their 
position will prevent those criticisms from pursuit, so long as their views retain 
prominence. One facet of the problem of uniformity raised is just that these incen-
tives – publication and professional advance – are lacking, or much weaker and 
unsystematic, in non-institutional settings. 
Another epistemic virtue that raises the incentive and uniformity problem is 
impartiality or fairness, particularly as applied to how one searches for evidence. A 
procedure that appears in conflict with this virtue is to stop searching when you 
have found supportive data, but not to, however, for unsupportive data. Robyn 
Dawes considers something like this overtly biased stopping rule irrational: 
We double-check results that are displeasing to us, but we are much less apt to dou-
ble or triple-check results that we find pleasing. (Dawes, 2000: 153) 
Actually, I expect that the stopping rule is applied much more selectively than 
Dawes indicates, though I will not pursue this point beyond the observation that 
one line we draw follows on the first difference noted in the opening in relation to 
costs. When it comes to purchasing an expensive item, like a car, where a variety 
of independent sources can be easily examined (Consumer Reports, web sites), 
the stopping rule is much less favored than in opinionated or controversial topics, 
where one has mainly an intellectual stake. 
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In domains where the stopping rule operates for an individual, I grant that 
there is something right about Dawes suspicions, stemming from the values of 
impartiality and open-mindedness. Nevertheless, his dismissal of any such asym-
metrical treatment of favorable and unfavorable sources is misguided. It stems 
from failure to give the costs of searching its due. It also ignores the role of the 
division of epistemic labor in lessening those costs to the individual, while en-
couraging others to articulate negative evidence more efficiently, since more in 
line with their expertise, time, and interests. 
Opposition to the stopping rule also neglects the social commitments needed 
to keep intellectual inquiries going. These inquiries require loyalty in order to se-
cure participation of others. I am not going to devote myself to an inquiry which 
requires the cooperation of others, if I know that their commitment will lapse 
whenever individual judgment casts doubt on the position (hypotheses) we hold. If 
the impartiality demanded is to view one’s own position with the same detached, 
unbiased view as with which one views others, and to act accordingly, these 
commitments to a cooperative enterprise cannot be sustained. In his famous auto-
biography, revealing the seamier side of scientific pursuit, James Watson (1969) 
recounts how he and Francie Crick, on their way to discovering the double-helix 
structure of DNA, fed a rival bad information to keep him off track. Although this 
may be an extreme, it certainly is consistent with a realistic view of competition 
for, and cooperation toward, original discovery as at variance with a demand for 
purity of motive and action. 
Dawes’ suspicions are curious since, if I am correct, it is rife with counterex-
amples that he should appreciate, as it almost certainly characterizes his own 
practice. He neglects the first-person point of view of the inquirer, as if we would 
explain ourselves as acting on the stopping rule, when, in fact, conforming to it. 
But the pleasure from corroborative sources and the displeasure at dissenting ones 
are not how I represent to myself why I should double-check in one case, but not 
the other. In one case, there is conflict with my beliefs (arguments), so I have 
reason to double check, since doubting its reliability. But in the other case, there 
is accord with my beliefs, so I have much less reason to keep searching. 
These conclusions appear too strong – justifying dismissiveness or prejudicial 
argumentation – even if it is granted that intellectual slack can be distributed 
across the division of epistemic labor and even if we put aside the cases where 
self-interest relaxes the stopping rule, if it will involve little effort. We are capable 
of (and must take) not only a first-person perspective from within our arguments, 
but also an observer or second-order one. From that point of view, one knows that 
some of one’s beliefs, or the arguments for them, are likely distorted or mistaken, 
and one wants to know which. An excellent way to discern if one’s beliefs or 
arguments are mistaken is to take seriously the objections of others or to examine 
potentially contrary sources. The inquirer, recognizing himself as fallible, has rea-
son to examine some of these objections, even though he regards them as errone-
ous. (Adler, 2002: Chapter 11)   48
In limiting the demands for virtue, as a condition of membership in an intel-
lectual community or in the pursuit of inquiry, an obstacle is removed to inquir-
ers articulating and defending their positions in public forums. The intellectual 
life of the community is benefitted. You all know highly original and productive 
thinkers whose motivation to contribute partly depends on the free reign of their 
intellectual immodesty (conceit, bragging), ruthlessness or indifference toward 
critics, coddling of loyal followers, vanity, and self-promotion (e.g., self-
citations). ‘Vaulting ambition’ is a spur to intellectual boldness, even if it is not 
an epistemic virtue or if it generally facilitates acquisition of non-virtuous traits 
of character.
7 
So long as the intellectual community’s standards are high, I am arguing, 
tolerance for deviation from the epistemic virtues does better to maintain a lively 
variety of ideas in inquiry than would a demand for purity of motive. The former 
ease the burden on participation and even encourage it, since allowing inquirers 
to indulge their more self-interested and self-advancing motives. My criticisms 
of a demand for uniformity of virtues across the community is at one with my 
objection to a conception of the intellectual virtues as the high ideals that EV 
theorists propose, especially in regard to its demands for virtuous motivation 
within social inquiries. 
8. The line of criticism that I have offered undermines the parallel with the Ar-
istotelian moral virtues not only for the advocacy of a uniformity of virtue and 
motivational purity, but for its correlative recommendation that to discern how one 
should act one should follow those with the virtues and practical wisdom. In the 
example of Thurmond, he is doing what some person concerned with the epis-
temic advance of the community would do, or would encourage others to do, who 
recognized the danger of the consensus in the Senate. The result poses a further 
problem for Zagzebski who defines “justified” on analogy to “praiseworthy”: 
A person A is praiseworthy (justified) for doing an act (having a belief) S just in case A 
does what a virtuous person would (probably) do (believes what a virtuous person 
would [probably] believe) in the same circumstances and is motivated by virtuous mo-
tives. (236)
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7
   The prospects for EV theory drops precipitously if we abandon the Aristotelian portrait of character 
traits. The portrait requires that epistemically virtuous persons be consistent across settings in his 
guidance by the virtues, which I have accepted for the sake of discussion. The consistency re-
quirement for the moral virtues, where it is far more plausible on grounds stated above, has been 
recently disputed on empirical grounds. See Doris 2002. 
8
   The definition follows Aristotle in distinguishing between the one who has the virtuous disposition 
and the neophyte who lacks the disposition, but attempts to conform to it (as a way, presumably, 
of developing the disposition and, ultimately, the character trait.) In the central argument, the dis-
tinction corresponds to that between the weaker thesis of prescribing actions in accord with the 
vice and the stronger thesis, dependent on our psychology, that to act in accord with the vice leads 
to the corresponding disposition or character trait.   49
In the Thurmond example, his viceful acts promote epistemic ends, and better 
than if he had acted virtuously. But they require that he maintain his badly unjus-
tified belief (that the bill is seriously flawed and should just be rejected). Yet, this 
is what an epistemically concerned individual would be pulled to do in those cir-
cumstances, albeit from a different motive. The dilemma is that either this is what 
an epistemically virtuous person would do or not. If it is not, then epistemic virtue 
and advance at the group level, and then derivatively for the individual, do not 
march in step. If it is, then the epistemically virtuous person acts for the goal (mo-
tive) of the epistemic virtues by bringing himself (or others) to engage in non-
virtuous acts. 
Now it may seem that Zagzebski has a maneuver available to handle exam-
ples like this one. She claims that even if the vices are truth-conducive at a time, 
they will not be in the long run (and conversely for the virtues): 
as long as we look at a large number of Joe’s beliefs formed over time, open-
mindedness will be ultimately truth conducive, even for him. I conclude that it is true 
that an agent does not possess an intellectual virtue unless the trait as possessed by 
him is truth conducive in the long run, but there may be a period of time during which 
it is not truth conducive. (186)
9 
But these claims do not resolve the difficulty, since they do not allow that devia-
tion from the virtues and even acting on the vices can be regularly truth – or 
knowledge-conducive. In particular, they assist in off-setting tendencies both 
toward the homogeneity of ideas in the public forum and against strong participa-
tion in inquiry. The latter requires one to put forth and defend one’s position, as 
well as to be willing to challenge dominant and admired voices. 
9. In closing, I’ll summarize and slightly extend my criticisms of EV theory as 
part of a response to what I take to be the main objection to them: Uniformity of 
epistemic virtues is not only compatible with a great diversity of ideas and meth-
ods, but it will encourage and promote it, including the motivation to pursue in-
quiry and the willingness to dissent, and far better than communities that fall 
short in the distribution of the epistemic virtues. It is bad pun to assimilate the 
“uniformity” of a uniformity of virtues to the “uniformity” of a uniformity of ideas. 
After all, originality and intellectual boldness, for obvious cases, are epistemic 
virtues. The demand for diversity and epistemically valuable motivation can be 
handled naturally by our self-interest, individual differences in our dispositions and 
                             
9
 Further: 
  dogmatism is not truth conducive for most people most of the time. When intellectual vices are 
truth conducive, they are only truth conducive relative to a narrow range of belief-forming prac-
tices, usually of a single individual and usually only within the scope of a particular area of knowl-
edge or belief...It is possible, of course, that a person is dogmatic only within a very limited area, 
one that he knows extremely well and one in which dogmatism is truth conducive. And it may  
even be possible that such a person has no tendency to dogmatism in areas in which it is not truth 
conducive. If this can happen, I am willing to say that this trait is not a vice. (1996: 193-194; she 
admits exceptions 312-19).   50
background, the enjoyment of lively discussion, and the very large numbers in-
volved in social inquiries in open, pluralist communities.
10 
If my criticisms are even roughly on target, the objection is unrealistic psycho-
logically, socially, and epistemically. The objector and I agree that diversity of ideas 
is important for the well-functioning of intellectual inquiries, which is major source 
of epistemic advance. Communities of inquiry are vulnerable, however, to premature 
consensus with its correlative loss of diversity. The social problem is that communi-
ties of inquiry are still communities with an enjoyment of solidarity and consensus. 
These pleasures and rewards filter down to the individual level in social and psycho-
logical pressure toward harmony with others. Just as dissent among real inquirers is 
rarely purely intellectual, so intellectual engagement is rarely purely intellectual, 
even within academic settings and certainly not outside them. Differences over 
political and social issues, even when fairly abstract, inevitably give rise to personal 
differences and animosity toward those in opposition and to positive fellow feeling 
toward those who share one’s views. There is also the epistemic pulls toward con-
sensus: respect and deference to the community. Consequently, a small consensus 
favoring an idea, in areas where decisive evidence is difficult to come by, feeds on 
itself both socially and epistemically. 
Outside of institutional settings, there is a lack of external motivation to pursue 
argument and to be original, specifically, to challenge a dominant view and to ad-
vance new ideas despite unpopularity. Of course, I allow for a good deal of intellec-
tual curiosity, personality differences, especially in how outspoken one is and how 
much one needs to be popular, as well as great variation in individual orientation on 
sensitive issues e.g., a highly religious vs. a purely secular upbringing. 
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   A word on the ground rules that have structured my argument that I provide in response to a helpful 
comment from the editor. I assume that the question of the proper motives and character for inquirers 
to best realize epistemic goals is to be answered without abstracting away from a range of normal 
human motives, interests, limits, and circumstances, particularly those that are central to pursuing in-
quiry: curiosity, competitiveness, a desire to understand, a need to economize, fallibility, dependence 
on others. There are, of course, epistemological issues or claims that warrant much greater idealization 
or abstraction. Thus, one might take the view that p is proper for an agent to believe only if p is what 
a rational being would believe for whom p answered a question of his, when he had all the information 
that the agent does, and the rational being is reasoning correctly and his only aim is truth. Especially 
the last two of these idealizations are too strong for the problems that EV theory is meant to address, 
as well as for the extended comparison with Aristotelian moral virtues. Virtues are necessary to re-
strain and guide self-interest, and to overcome fallacious assumptions and inclinations (to e.g., dogma-
tism, partiality, and laziness) that are obstacles to improving knowledge. We cannot then maintain the 
problematic to which EV theory is addressed, while abstracting away from ourselves as rational crea-
tures who have multiple interests and motives, who are fallible, limited, and dependent on information 
from others, with a complex psychology, and who can take advantage of our social participation in a 
community toward mutually beneficial ends. However, while I then do not idealize away from these 
conditions and circumstances, the realistic assumptions about our epistemic predicament that frame 
this paper are not restrictive or parochial. Assumptions of competitiveness or potentially corrupting 
motives or desires for popularity or group harmony are, I think, minimal assumptions about human so-
cial nature. In not abstracting away from them, no substantial limits are imposed on the epistemic in-
quiries to which our argument applies. In sum, the realism assumptions adopted here aim to fit com-
fortably between the extreme idealization that would nullify the problematic and the extreme ultra-
realism or contextualism, which constricts the scope of the problematic that applies to most any sys-
tematic epistemic or cognitive inquiry.   51
But these are far weaker, as our shared experience shows, than the personal, 
social, and epistemic pulls away from dissent and boldness in view of our fallibility 
and the serious possibility of false persuasion and groupthink. My conclusion is 
that given these realistic facts of non-institutional inquiries, which lack external 
incentives and procedures for enforcement, a community made up of the epis-
temically virtuous will be less able to resist cheap consensus and to motivate 
participation in inquiry and argumentation, than one that is made up of only 
mostly epistemically virtuous members. Further, even among those who are epis-
temically virtuous, they should not be saddled with the burden that their epis-
temic virtues parallel the Aristotelian moral virtues (as “means” between opposed 
extremes). The pleasure to be found with mature development of the latter, in a 
community of the like-minded, does not transfer to the epistemic virtues. Dissent 
requires a few who are intellectually obstinate and dogmatic to challenge the 
dominant view. Even those who are epistemically virtuous should not allow their 
self-interest to wait upon the arrival of virtuous motivation. 
I take EV theory to imply the contrary, given their guiding parallel with the 
moral virtues, which the four differences I note at the opening argues is implausi-
ble. EV theory implies that an inquiring community with all, or just about all, who 
are epistemically virtuous is preferable to any that fall short of it (accidents aside), 
where epistemically virtuous acts require virtuous motivation. When the objection 
talks about dissent as thriving naturally on human diversity, self-interest, and the 
large number of members of the community of inquirers, I take it to tacitly con-
cede the bulk of my criticism–what they are admitting is only that the absence of 
a uniformity of epistemic virtues probably will occur naturally (and thankfully). 
Even here though the objectors do not appreciate that the obvious epistemic 
costs of some who lack the epistemic virtues or who even adopt some of the vices 
in inquiry can be compensated for effortlessly by the division of epistemic labor, 
which itself arises naturally (from our diversity of interests and limits on opportu-
nity). There is little parallel with the moral domain at the crucial juncture of the 
first difference stated in the opening. The epistemic virtues are directed to judg-
ments of little consequence, while moral ones are directed to actions of personal 
and social consequence. Take again the moral and epistemic virtue of impartiality. 
I have defended an easing of impartiality as a demand. In particular, I allow 
greater freedom in how an individual treats objections and counter-evidence to 
one’s position than under an impartialist demand. On an impartialist demand, one 
seeks an objective assessment of various sources of relevant information. One then 
follows that assessment rather than one’s own inclination as to which sources are 
preferable, even though the preferable, and more pleasurable, sources are those 
that are antecedently known to favor one’s view. Not only is engaging in inquiry 
better motivated by the lessened demand, but it is implausible that the commit-
ment to intellectual inquiry (pursuing a certain position) can be sustained, unless 
others know that you share that commitment. You cannot share that commitment, 
yet admit to treating your position with the same detached impartiality as others 
would, who are not members of your group.   52
Of course, there are limits to this partiality and there must be given that the 
ultimate aim remains truth. There is little danger here that this partiality will harm 
that aim, so long as there are competing groups pursing rival positions. I may 
ignore a source that provides strong evidence against my position, but the rival 
groups will surely find and publicize it. The division of epistemic labor is at work. 
But I will also not regularly ignore such sources since my self-interest lies with 
getting matters correctly, which, as is obvious, lies with responsivity to the evi-
dence and to the weight of argument. 
There is also little danger of harm from this partiality since it is directed to 
judgment, not action. The moral domain is quite different. If I discriminate in favor of 
a stranger for a neighbor’s son in hiring, there is obviously no division of moral labor 
that can compensate for it, even granted the possibility of moral experts. 
The concern with virtuous character itself is a recognition that our intellectual 
judgment is a small part of the influences on how we act, which is typically affected 
by a host of motives of which we have limited access. It is one thing to decide that I 
should hire fairly, it is another for this intellectual judgment to really penetrate to 
how I act in conflict situations (e.g., one candidate is a friend’s son). Character goes 
far deeper to withstand various motivational influences on actions. But in the intel-
lectual domain what inquiry wrestles with are only those reasons that can be pub-
licly presented and evaluated, not their efficacy at the level of action nor the myriad 
of psychological or non-conscious influences on them. 
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